

# End-to-End Infrastucture Security

Security Protocol and Data Model
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#### **Disclaimer**

- The information in this presentation represents a snapshot of work in progress within the DMTF.
- This information is subject to change without notice. The standard specifications remain the normative reference for all information.
- For additional information, see the DMTF website.
- This information is a summary of the information that will appear in the specifications. See the specifications for further details.



## **Cypher Security Report**

- December 19, 2013
  - Target retail store data breach cost \$252 million and Target's CEO his job.
- Mid-2016
  - Yahoo user accounts were hacked, cut \$350 million from Verizon's Yahoo acquisition price.
- August 16, 2017
  - Maersk reported that the NotPetya cyberattack could cost their business \$300 million in lost revenue
- October 4, 2018
  - Bloomberg report on a physical attack on a particular server vendor's platform.
  - Ultimately, no evidence was found but experts have re-created the alleged scenario.
- January 22, 2019
  - U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency issued an emergency directive to mitigate DNS infrastructure



## **Existing Security Solutions**

- Two Categories
  - Inside the Platform
  - Remote-based Attack
- Inside The Platform
  - Security solutions that protect data inside the platform.
  - Examples:
    - Secure Boot
    - Secure Storage (of direct attach, on-board storage such as SPI Flash)
- Remote-based Attack
  - Security solutions that protect data that is being remotely accessed (often over the network)
  - Examples:
    - SSL (deprecated) / TLS
    - IPSec
    - Anti-Virus/Malware/Spyware
    - Firewalls



## **Missing Security Solutions**

- Infrastructure
  - Mainly, Building Trust from End-to-End
  - Examples
    - Chip to Chip
      - In-the-box Wires (e.g. PCIe, I2C, I3C, SPI, USB, CAN, etc...)
    - Building Trusted Channel between Components
    - The Physical Aspect of an Infrastructure.
    - Platforms
      - Blades/Racks/Desktops
      - Mobile
      - IoT
    - Fabric-based Platforms
      - Remote Resources (outside traditional management domain)



## **Building Security in Infrastructure**

- Need to start from the ground up. The ground builds the infrastructure.
- What is the ground?
  - The hardware that builds the infrastructure
  - Specifically:
    - Communicating Devices (e.g. network controllers, GPUs, video devices, storage devices, etc...)
    - Non-communicating components (e.g. power supplies, fans, etc...)
    - The Interconnects (i.e. the physical wires/buses)
- Why?
  - They are all subject to attack.
    - Threats include supply-chain attacks.
  - Exploitation is shifting from software to hardware/firmware.
  - If there is gain to be had, then it will be exploited.



## **Security Protocol and Data Model 1.0**

- How?
  - Two Major Features
    - Authentication
    - Attestation
  - Capable of being referenced by other standards.
    - DMTF is initially mapping to MCTP.
    - Alliance Partners are considering mapping SPDM to their standards.













## **Security Protocol and Data Model 1.0**

- Other Important Features:
  - Leveraged and Extended USB authentication.
- **USB**Enabling Connections™

- Extensible
- Negotiable Communication Details (e.g. version, algorithms, capabilities)
- Flexible for Implementors
- Transport Agnostic: Other Standards can leverage this.
- Platform-Independent



#### **SPDM 1.0 – Authentication**

- Allows a platform to verify the identity of the attached component.
- Redfish
  - Identity is also exposed in Redfish.
- Enables a platform to determine what to do if the identity of a component did not verify correctly.
- Cryptography
  - Leverage X.509v3 certificates




### **SPDM 1.0 – Attestation**

- Allows a platform to verify the state of the component.
- Multiple measurements allow platforms to verify various configurations of the component.
- Measurements:
  - Hashes of various configurations of a component
- Examples of Measurement Coverage (Implementation Choices):
  - Immutable Code
  - Mutable Code
  - Boot Stages
  - Configuration Data
  - State Variables




## **PMCI MCTP Security Proposal – Diagram View**








# MCTP Message Type 5 (Security Commands) Format





SPDM 1.0 - Ladder



www.dmtf.org



## **Future Work**

- Protection: Encryption / Integrity
- Measurement log
- Set certificate command
- Measurement manifest (Local attestation)



## **Summary**

- SPDM 1.0
  - Provides Authentication and Attestation
- In general, SPDM
  - Provides building blocks and tools to secure the Infrastructure.



#### **Call to Action**

- Would like the Industry to use SPDM as a security protocol for their standard(s).
- Would like the Industry to work with DMTF (PMCI Security TF) to help extend SPDM for their needs.
  - Provide feedback via DMTF Portal.
  - Help us with future specification development.



#### References

- DMTF
  - Main Website: <a href="https://www.dmtf.org/">https://www.dmtf.org/</a>
  - PMCI Workgroup: <a href="https://www.dmtf.org/standards/pmci">https://www.dmtf.org/standards/pmci</a>
    - Updated News for SPDM
    - Security Protocol and Data Model (DSP 274)
    - SPDM MCTP Binding (DSP 275)
    - Upcoming White Paper
  - Redfish:
    - Workgroup: <a href="https://www.dmtf.org/standards/redfish">https://www.dmtf.org/standards/redfish</a>
    - Developer's Hub : https://www.dmtf.org/standards/redfish



#### References

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  - https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/14/technology/yahoo-hack.html
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